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Is SEC Rule 146 Too Subjective to
Provide the Needed Predictability
In Private Offerings?
I. INTRODUCTION
Section five of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") requires
that all' issuers of securities must register with the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), except where the Act provides a
specific exemption from the registration requirements. A primary
objective of the 1933 Act is to provide investors with material in-
formation regarding publicly offered securities.2 To accomplish
this purpose, section 5 of the Act requires that a registration state-
ment setting forth the relevant information be filed with the SEC
before offering securities to the public; however, there are exemp-
tions from these registration requirements.3 One such exemption
B.S. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Member of State
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1. Section 5 of the 1933 Act actually applies only where an instrument
of interstate commerce is used to sell a security. As a practical mat-
ter it is nearly impossible to sell securities without using the mails,
telephones, etc., and thus fall outside the jurisdiction of the Act.
2. The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") is concerned solely with
whether there has been adequate disclosure of material facts relating
to the securities being offered for sale, and not with the fairness of
the price and terms of the offering.
3. For further basic information concerning the 1933 Act and the registra-
tion of securities, the reader should see R. JENNMGS & H. MARSH, SE-
cunrrms REGULATIOx (3d ed. 1972) which describes the registration
process as follows:
To facilitate the registration of securities by different types
of issuing companies, the Commission has prepared special
registration forms which vary in their disclosure requirements
to provide disclosure of the essential facts pertinent in a given
type of offering while at the same time minimizing the burden
and expense of compliance with the law. In general, the ret-
istration forms call for disclosure of information such as ()
a description of the registrant's properties and business, (2)
a description of the significant provisions of the security to
be offered for sale and its relationship to the registrant's other
capital securities, (3) information about the management of
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is found in section 4 (2), which states that section 5 shall not apply
to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
Exactly what characteristics make up a non-public offering of
securities is not revealed by the 1933 Act;4 therefore, this defini-
tional task has fallen to the courts. Unfortunately, the various
judicial decisions construing this test have not clarified the mean-
ing of "non-public," but have only increased the confusion in this
area. 5 Recognizing this failure by the SEC and the courts to pro-
the registrant, and (4) financial statements certified by inde-
pendent public accountants....
Id. at 35-36.
4. Although the 1933 Act itself offered no guidance in the interpretation
of section 42(2), the House Report did explain that "[t] he Act carefully
exempts from its application certain ... securities transactions where
there is no practical need for its application or where the public bene-
fits are too remote." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933)(emphasis added). The words "where the public benefits are too re-
mote" imply that the exemption includes offerings where the number
of buyers is so limited (i.e., where the offering is more private than
public) that the costs of registration cannot be justified.
5. The author assumes in this article that the reader is quite familiar with
the case law leading up to Rule 146. See Appendix for Rule 146. While
a knowledge of the pre-Rule 146 case law is necessary to a full under-
standing of the Rule, which is to a great extent a codification of exist-
ing law, discussion of these cases has been omitted since many articles
have already adequately covered this area. See, e.g., Alberg & Lybecker,
New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering
Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUm. L.
REV. 622 (1974); Kalokathis, The Private Offering under Rule 144 and
Proposed Rule 146: New Armor for an Old Warrior, 77 DIcK. L. REv.
585 (1973); McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IowA L.
REv. 525 (1974); Note, SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemp-
tion, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1125 (1974); 48 WASH. L. Rzv. 922 (1973).
Two cases, however, are so vital to the context behind Rule 146
that a succinct review of them is in order. The seminal case in the
private offering area is SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125(1953), where the Court established the basic criteria for testing the
applicability of section 4(2). The test propounded was whether the of-
ferees need the protection afforded by the Act as evidenced by whether
the offerees have access to the same kind of information that registra-
tion would disclose and whether they are able to fend for themselves.
Note 59 infra. Thus, the Court gave birth to the now accepted notion
that offerees should be financially "sophisticated." To determine the
question of sophistication in subsequent cases, the courts looked to the
totality of circumstances surrounding the transaction, particularly the
attributes of the offeree. It should not be surprising that this ad hoc
approach resulted in different courts stressing different factors.
A relatively recent case illustrating a strict view of the access re-
quirement is SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972). The court stated: "[t]he record does not establish that each
offeree had a relationship with the issuer giving access to the kind
of information that registration would have disclosed." Id. at 160.
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vide an objective or predictable criterion for applying the non-
public offering exemption, former SEC Chairman William Casey
stated in 1972: "For 40 years there has been great uncertainty as
to what constitutes a private offering."6
The courts' failure to establish standards upon which conscien-
tious businessmen could rely in seeking to raise capital via private
offerings was the chief impetus for SEC Rule 146, which is an
attempt to establish discernable guidelines for issuers. In promul-
gating Rule 146, the SEC explicitly stated:
The Commission believes that a rule creating greater certainty
in the application of the Section 4(2) exemption is in the public
interest for two reasons. First, such a rule should deter reliance
on that exemption for offerings of securities to persons who are un-
able to fend for themselves in terms of obtaining and evaluating
information about the issuer and in certain situations, of assuming
the risk of investment. These persons need the protections afforded
by the registration process. Second, such a rule should reduce
uncertainty to the extent feasible and provide more objective stand-
ards upon which responsible businessmen may rely in raising capi-
tal in a manner that complies with the requirements of the Act.7
The purpose of this article is not simply to describe the various
-provisions of the Rule. Instead, it will focus on the ambiguity and
subjectivity of the provisions of Rule 146 in an effort to ascertain
whether that Rule in fact fulfilled the SEC's expressed purpose
of providing greater certainty in determining when the private
offering exemption is applicable.8  A secondary purpose of the
article will be to explore whether the uncertainties inherent in Rule
146 are especially oppressive to small investors and businessmen.
Thus, at least the Fifth Circuit had come to require of offerees a sort
of "privileged relationship" with the issuer. Apparently only "insiders"
safely fell within the exemption.
6. Erwin, Goodbye Private Placement, Hello 146-Recent Appellate
Court Decisions Suggest that Investment Bankers Should No Longer
Rely on the Private Placement Exemption, 6 CEIGHToN L. REv. 127
(1972).
7. SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261-62 (1974) (emphasis added).
8. Even though Rule 146 became effective on June 10, 1974, an analysis
of the Rule is still pertinent because the SEC has declared it does not
consider the Rule impervious to alteration or even abandonment:
It should be recognized that the Rule is intended to be in the
nature of an experiment and that the Commission will observe
its operation to determine whether it is consistent with the
objectives of the Act. If experience with the proposed Rule
indicates that it is not operating for the protection of investors
or in the public interest, it will be rescinded or appropriately
amended.
SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,266 (1974). See also
SEC Amendments to Rule 146, SEC Release No. 5585 (1975).
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Because the following analysis centers around the notion of
certainty, it is appropriate to begin with a brief elucidation of why
predictability is crucial in the private placement market. The pri-
mary rationale for the private offering is that it allows venture
capital to be raised with limited expense and minimal investor
harm. The vast importance of the private offering as a money-
raising mechanism is mirrored in the fact that in the mid-1960s over
half the new corporate offerings utilized the non-public offering
exemption. 9 The SEC is also cognizant of the financing potential
of private offerings for smaller firms, and accordingly has stated:
... [t]he lack of objective standards in the private placement
area may be hindering the raising of capital by new businesses
that are not sufficiently seasoned to attract investment banking
firms willing to underwrite public offerings of their securities.10
The conclusion seems warranted that to the extent the application
of the non-public offering exemption is clouded, small issuers, in
particular, will feel the pinch. The newer, smaller issuers normally
present the greatest potential for risk and, therefore, courts will be
especially harsh in construing the exemption's application to such
"risky" enterprises. Another irony is that small issuers, seeking
relatively small amounts of capital, may be forced to go to those
investors-small investors-least likely to qualify as possessing the
degree of sophistication called for by the Rule."
From a practical standpoint, all issuers should be greatly con-
cerned about the potentially immense civil liabilities which might
confront them if an after-the-fact decision is made that the section
4(2) exemption does not apply to an offering they effected. More
specifically, section 12(1) of the 1933 Act provides a private right
of action to any purchaser of an unregistered, non-exempt security.
The issuer's only defense is that an exemption from registration
applies. Thus, if an issuer mistakenly sells to even one buyer not
meeting the standards of sophistication, etc., the entire exemption
could be lost.
Since the issuer will have to pay rescission damages where it
mistakenly invoked the private offering exemption, there will exist
a temptation on the part of buyers of securities to contest the appli-
cability of the exemption whenever the deal has gone sour. And,
it should be clear that the more ambiguous the test for the non-
9. SEC, 23 STATISTIcAL BULL. No. 10, at 8 (1964).
10. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 79,108, at 82,398
(1972).
11. One reason small issuers may often have to seek small investors is
that many institutional investors are uninterested in making anything
other than large investments.
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public offering exemption-that is, Rule 146-the more potential
ammunition there is for recalcitrant buyers.12
This article will show that many of Rule 146's provisions are
broad or open to interpretation. Since Rule 146 adopts such confus-
ing concepts as "sophistication" and "access" from the case law,
courts may be compelled to look to past decisions for help in defin-
ing these terms. Yet a return trip to the morass of the case law
is not the means to achieve greater safety or certainty. Which
of the diverse cases should be honored for their guidance? The
most recent? Those with the strictest tests?
Given the importance of predictability to private offering
issuers, the next question becomes what degree of subjectivity, and
therefore uncertainty, is embodied in Rule 146.
IT. ANALYSIS
This section of the article will analyze the language of the
provisions of Rule 146,13 and will highlight the flexible nature of
12. Given the recent step-up in litigation in the securities law area, issuers
should find the possibility of private suits a particularly alarming
prospect.
13. The Preliminary Notes to Rule 146 establish the "ground rules" with
respect to when the Rule is applicable. These Preliminary Notes pre-
sent no blatant ambiguities and, therefor% they will not be discussed
separately. Rather, they will be mentioned at appropriate points in
discussion of the text of Rule 146.
Preliminary Note 2, however, will be treated here since it is
equally applicable to all of the text. It declares that "[n] othing in
this rule obviates the need for compliance with any applicable state
law relating to the offer and sale of securities." This straightforward
statement confirms that the Federal Government has no intention of
preempting state securities law. Since Rule 146 is more liberal than
most state private offering exemptions, there may be instances where
a private distribution of securities would have to be registered under
the blue sky laws of certain states, even though no registration would
be required by federal law.
Nebraska's blue sky law offers an apt illustration. The Nebraska
statute provides an exemption from registration under the Nebraska
Securities Act only where no more than ten offers to sell securities
are made to Nebraska citizens in a twelve month period. In counting
whether ten offers have been made, Nebraska does exempt offers to
certain institutions. NEs. REv. STAT. § 8-1111(8) (Reissue 1970). Nev-
ertheless, Nebraska's ten offerees rule is clearly more stringent than
Rule 146.
It could be argued that the states should revise their private offer-
ing provisions to conform with Rule 146 so that the usefulness of the
SEC's Rule will be maximized. Specifically, a harmonizing of state
rules with Rule 146 would lessen the challenge offered by multi-state
registration, which is presently a time-consuming and expensive proc-
6 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
that language. The journey through the Rule's provisions will be
chronological, covering definitions, conditions to be met, limitations
on manner of offering, sophistication, access, business combinations,
number of purchasers, and limitations on disposition.
A. Definitions-146(a)
The ambiguities in Rule 146 begin to surface at its outset. In
subsection (a) (1) "offeree representative" is defined as follows:
(1) Oferee Representative. The term "offeree representa-
tive" shall mean any person or persons, each of whom the issuer
and any person acting on its behalf, after making reasonable in-
quiry, have reasonable grounds to believe and believe satisfies all
of the following conditions:
(i) is not an affiliate, director, officer or other employee
of the issuer, or beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any
class of the equity securities or 10 percent or more of the equity
interest in the issuer; 14
(ii) has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he, either alone, or together with other
offeree representatives or the offeree, is capable of evaluating
the merits and risks of the prospective investment;
(iii) is acknowledged by the offeree, in writing, during
the course of the transaction,15 to be his offeree representative
in connection with evaluating the merits and risks of the pro-
spective investment; and
(iv) discloses to the offeree, in writing, prior to the
acknowledgement specified in subdivision (iii), any material
relationship between such person or its affiliates and the issuer
or its affiliates, which then exists or is mutually understood to
be contemplated or which has existed at any time during the
previous two years, and any compensation received or to be
received as a result of such relationship.
The major ambiguity in the definition of investment representa-
tive is found in the requirement that such a person have such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
ess due to the varying state standards. The counter argument, of
course, is that the states may have problems and considerations which
differ from those factors which influenced the formation of the Federal
Rule.
14. Subsections (a) (1) (i) (a)-(c) provide exceptions from (a) (1) i).
(Emphasis added).
15. One might infer from the use of the word "transaction," in the singu-
lar that the acknowledgement required by subdivision (iii) must be
made with specific reference to each prospective investment. Note 2
to Rule 146(a) (1), SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,266
(1974) confirms this inference.
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investment. In short, the offeree representative must have invest-
ment sophistication. As will be developed in the analysis of the
sophistication requirement in 146 (d),16 this is a very imprecise
standard, and courts have, predictably, differed in their interpreta-
tions of it.17 It follows that since the SEC has offered no explana-
tion of the sophistication concept in Rule 146, the private offering
exemption will continue to bedevil conscientious businessmen and
their attorneys.
Another factor causing the elusive sophistication test to be
oppressive is the requirement in section 146 (a) (i) that the issuer
make reasonable inquiry and have reasonable grounds to believe
that the offeree's representative is financially sophisticated. Thus,
16. See notes 30-44 and accompanying text infra. In addition to further
refinement of the sophistication concept, the treatment of 146(d) in-
cludes further discussion of the offeree representative provision.
17. For a discussion of some of the cases decided after Ralston-Purina
which grappled in varied fashion with the sophistication notion, see
Comment, Proposed SEC Rule 146: The Quest for Objectivity, 41
FoDHAm L. REv. 887, 895-907 (1973). For specific cases see SEC v.
Ralston-Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Continental Tobacco
Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d
675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); Garfield v. Strain,
320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Some of the difficulties which stand in the way of defining "sophis-
tication" are suggested by the following:
The "fending for themselves" standard, which is synonymous
with "sophistication," has proved no less confusing ....
Apart from institutional investors, however, one cannot be
sure of what the phrase actually means, since it has been used
in two different senses. On the one hand, it has been stated
that no one is per se sophisticated without access to the infor-
mation. As used in this sense, the term simply means that
access is a prerequisite to sophistication, and an independent
inquiry of sophistication would be unnecessary. On the other
hand, it has been stated that sophistication is not a substitute
for access and that one must be shown to have access and be
sophisticated. In this sense, the phrase has significance inde-
pendent of the offering and even of the access requirement.
It implies that an individual deciding to partake in a private
offering, by virtue of his education, business acumen and prior
investment experience, etc., will arguably be able to under-
stand and evaluate the information, enabling him to make an
informed investment decision. Hence, the issuer would have
to prove that the offeree had "access," and in addition, that
he could "fend for himself." In either situation, however, the
overriding consideration is whether there exists the elusive re-
lationship which would justify relying on the exemption in
the first instance. (Footnotes omitted.)
Comment, Proposed SEC Rule 146: The Quest for Objectivity, 41
FoarnAm L. REv. 887, 902 (1973).
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even assuming that the issuer satisfies the vague "reasonable
inquiry"'I s criterion, it must reach the correct conclusion from the
information it has garnered. Specifically, if it is determined, after
the private placement has been accomplished, that the offeree
representative in fact was not able to evaluate the risks, it would
appear that the exemption would vanish. The harsh consequence
might be that the whole offering would violate section 5 of the
1933 Act, as suggested by section (b) of Rule 146.
B. Conditions to be Met-146(b)
The first paragraph of this section declares that all the provi-
sions of Rule 146 must be met before the exemption is available. 19
It follows that if the issuer fails to conform to any of the condi-
tions, irrespective of their insignificance, the protection of Rule 146
will be lost. Arguably, such a rigid requirement will result in in-
creased litigation, because buyers of stock which has plummeted in
value will be tempted to bring an action for rescission against the
issuer, claiming the Rule had not been satisfied in every respect.20
The harshness of this cumulative aspect of the Rule's provisions
would be ameliorated if the various criteria imposed by the Rule
were concrete or objective. It is a cruel hoax to tell issuers that
the "good news" is that all they need do to comply with the Rule
is strictly meet all its requirements, but the "bad news" is that how
one meets those requirements is a puzzle.
It is this all or nothing aspect of Rule 146 which makes it
potentially grossly unfair.21 In order to alleviate this dilemma,
18. The incorporation of the "reasonable inquiry" test assures even greater
subjectivity in the interpretation of this provision. Does a reasonable
inquiry involve questioning by the issuer of the offeree representa-
tive's business associates, or does it merely involve having the offeree
representative fill out a form?
19. Preliminary Note 3 to Rule 146 also emphasizes that:
In order to obtain the protection of the rule, all its conditions
must be satisfied and the issuer claiming the availability of
the rule has the burden of establishing, in an appropriateforum, that it has satisfied them. The burden of proof applies
with respect to each offeree as well as each purchaser.
SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,266 (1974) (emphasis
added).
20. Since the entire private offering would then be in violation of the
1933 Act, the issuer would be at least potentially liable civilly to every
purchaser! Query whether such "punishment" really fits the "crime."
21. Admittedly, it is possible that courts would overlook a minor breach
of Rule 146 in deciding whether the offering qualified as non-public
under the section 4(2) case law. Even though the issuer attempted
to comply with Rule 146, that does not constitute an election on its
RULE 146
one commentator has suggested that the SEC should establish a
"substantial compliance" test which would allow the exemption to
be applicable in cases where the failure to meet a particular provi-
sion of the Rule was both innocent and immaterial.22  Given the
illusory nature of many of the required conditions of the Rule, this
suggestion would be a legitimate method of injecting a measure of
fairness into the application of Rule 146. It should be noticed, how-
ever, that such measures are really only aimed at treating the
symptoms rather than combatting the virus of Rule 146.23 More
specifically, what is needed is a major overhaul of Rule 146 with
the purpose of providing greater certainty as to the Rule's applica-
tion.24'
A laudible step toward -greater objectivity is manifested in
subsection (b) (1):
For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed
not to include offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securi-
ties of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided by Section
3 or Section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement
filed under the Act, that take place prior to the six month period
immediately preceding or after the six month period immediately
following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this rule,
provided, that there are during neither of said six month periods
any offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer
of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or
sold pursuant to the rule.
This "safe harbour" 25 provision protects issuers who have not
part-the courts are free to follow case law in testing for the offering.
Even assuming an offering would qualify under section 4(2) law, that
does not diminish the fact that Rule 146 would have failed to provide
greater certainty in applying the non-public offering exemption, since
it would end up tested by case law, which is exactly what Rule 146
was created to avoid.
22. Letter from Carl Schneider and Charles Zall to SEC, (Nov. 21, 1973).
This plan would still allow a sanction against the issuer for less than
full compliance with Rule 146, but would ensure that the "punishment
would fit the crime." Id.
23.. Ironically, the ambiguity in the provisions of Rule 146 may present
courts with the flexibility to allow minor, inadvertent failures to com-
ply without the loss of the exemption. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that since the language of Rule 146 (b) militates in favor of total
compliance, issuers cannot rely on such judicial mending.
24. Such a tentative alternative is sketched in Section ]II, infra.
25. Rule 146 as a whole is often referred to as a "safe harbour." This
is because Preliminary Note 1 states that Rule 146, far from presenting
a mandatory standard for the applicability of the private offering ex-
emption, offers a "safe harbour" for those issuers complying with its
requirements. Apparently, the SEC felt obliged to underscore the
non-exclusive nature of the Rule in that the Commission had received
letters expressing concern that the earlier Proposed Rule had not been
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offered for sale or sold similar securities within a six month period
on either side of the transaction in question.
26
But if there have been similar securities offered less than six
months prior to or subsequent to any offer or sale pursuant to Rule
146, then Preliminary Note 3 becomes apposite. A portion of it
directs the reader to SEC Release 33-4552 which gives factors indi-
cating whether offers and sales should be regarded as a part of
a larger offering and thus should be integrated. The integration
concept is of paramount importance since all offers, offers to sell,
offers for sale, or sales which are part of an offering must meet
all of the conditions of Rule 146 for the Rule to be available.
C. Limitation on Manner of Offering-146(c)
It has long been an accepted tenet that mass advertising cam-
paigns are not consonant with the notion of a "non-public" offering
of securities. The SEC has incorporated this general rule in
146 (c) (1), which states:
(c) Limitations on Manner of Offering. Neither the issuer
nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer, offer to sell, offer
for sale, or sell the securities by means of any form of general
solicitation or general advertising, including but not limited to, the
following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communi-
cation published in any newspaper, magazine or similar me-
dium or broadcast over television or radio; ....
sufficiently explicit as to the Rule's optional nature. See, e.g., Letter
from Sullivan & Cromwell to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate
Finance, SEC, Jan. 26, 1973, p. 2; Letter from Dewey, Ballantine,
Bushby, Palmer & Wood to Neal S. McCoy, Division of Corporate Fi-
nance, SEC, Jan. 29, 1973, p. 11.
If, then, it is felt that an issuer may not qualify under Rule 146,
an attempt may also be made to satisfy the criteria established by
current administrative and judicial interpretations. It should be rec-
ognized, however, that in such circumstances an attempt to qualify
outside the Rule is likely to fail. Since Rule 146 largely represents
a codification of existing case law, it is unlikely that the relevant
judicial decisions would afford relief to the issuer in situations where
the Rule would not. Further, section 4(2) compliance would be
guided by interpretations in effect "at the time of the transaction,"
and courts will, as a practical matter almost certainly adopt the pro-
visions of Rule 146, which went into effect June 10, 1974, as their
shibboleth, in deference to the SEC's acknowledged expertise in secu-
rities law. That is, the detailed checklist, provided in the form of
Rule 146, will understandably be viewed by judges as a welcome map
charting troublesome waters.
26. If there were offers or sales of similar securities, then the factors
defining integration, found in Preliminary Note 3, would be relevant.
RULE 146
One rationale for prohibiting general advertising of securities for
sale by the issuer is that since there is no numerical limitation
on offerees under Rule 146, without a limit on advertising the issuer
might be able to solicit such a large quantity of offers that it could
selectively accept certain offers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
perceive what harm could follow from such a selective process given
the framework of Rule 146, which requires all purchasers to be
financially sophisticated and able to obtain material information.
Section 146(c) (1) at least contains no patent ambiguities in its pro-
scription of general sales efforts (other than the usual issue of how
many offers constitute a "general" solicitation).
In the SEC's initial effort, Proposed Rule 146,2 7 the Commission
entirely banned the use of promotional meetings.28  Qualified use
of seminars and meetings is now allowed by 146 (c) (2). This sub-
section provides that offerees who are financially sophisticated, or
who are able to bear the economic risks, and are accompanied by
their sophisticated representatives, may attend meetings or semi-
nars where restricted securities are offered. Allowing group ses-
sions, at least under the SEC's restrictions, is a wise policy, for
sophisticated investors may be bolder in questioning the issuer
when there is strength in numbers, and the entire group would
be forced to reflect upon the views of the least enthusiastic mem-
bers of the group. However, there may be some problem in ascer-
taining precisely what is a "meeting" or "seminar" for purposes of
Rule 146 (c) (2). Conceivably, any group consisting of more than
one offeree would constitute a meeting. Yet, if "bandwagon fever"
was what the framers of this provision were endeavoring to pre-
vent, a group of two or three persons was probably not envisioned
as comprising a meeting. A prudent issuer, confronted with a situa-
tion where more than one offeree is present, would take care to
have a record made of exactly what ensued. The issuer must like-
wise be cognizant of the identity of everyone at any meetings. If,
for example, an unsophisticated offeree were to show up at a
scheduled meeting without a sophisticated representative, pre-
sumably a violation of Rule 146 would have occurred. Surpris-
ingly, the requirements of subsection (c) (2) are not satisfied by
the issuer's reasonable belief as to the qualifications of those
present. Instead that section sets down an absolute requirement
that no meetings shall take place with unqualified persons present.
27. SEC Release No. 5336, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
28. The SEC was rightly concerned that such promotional gatherings
might provide a forum for high pressure factors by the issuer. For
an interesting illustration of these techniques see Kalokathis, sitpra
note 5, at 591-92.
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This is just one more illustration of an overly harsh result flowing
from noncompliance with a Rule 146 provision which is latently
ambiguous: the sophistication requirement which section (c)
invokes is a nightmare for lawyers wishing to pinpoint the meaning
of that concept.
Section 146 (c) (3) provides for use of letters, circulars, notices or
or other written communications distributed only to offerees (and
their representatives) who satisfy the sophistication requirement
of subsection (d).29
D. Nature of Offerees-146(d)
The nature of the offeree has always been a central concern in
private offerings. It would, therefore, seem to be extremely impor-
tant that such a provision be easy to interpret. Nonetheless, even
a cursory reading of the applicable section, 146 (d), will unearth
legal terms and concepts ripe with ambiguity. 0 For example,
"reasonable grounds," "offers," "financial sophistication," "financial
security," "reasonable inquiry," and "offeree representative" are all
terms or concepts which raise major, if not insuperable, obstacles
to a predictable interpretation of 146 (d).
Even before offers to sell securities in a private placement are
made, the "issuer and any person acting on its behalf" shall have
"reasonable grounds" to believe that all offerees were sophisticated
or able to fend for themselves. 3 1  By employing this "reasonable
grounds" test, the SEC has created an area where a wide range
of conduct may or may not fulfill the requirement. The term
"reasonable" cries out for facts to supply the context in which
29. Section (c) (3) previously required letters, circulars, notices, or other
written communications to include a promise to provide section (e) (1)
information on request. SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,263
(1974). A recent SEC Release No. 5585, 40 Fed. Reg. 21,709 (1975),
deleted this requirement for (c) (3). This represents an improvement,
for what constitutes (e) (1) information is not crystal clear. See notes
49-50 and accompanying text infra. The purpose of this recent release
was "to provide more objective standards for determining whether
offers or sales of securities by an insurer would be deemed ... within
... Section 4(2) of the Act .... ." While every little bit helps, the
Commission did not face the most critical ambiguities plaguing Rule
146. Conspicuously absent from the SEC's amendments was any men-
tion of the subjectivity in the language relating to the notion of sop-
histication. And, the amendments considered only minimally the
access notion.
30. See Rule 146(d), Appendix.
31. By using the phrase "issuer and any person acting on its behalf" the
SEC has presumably eradicated any possibility of the issuer delegating
the duty of ascertaining reasonable grounds. Id. (emphasis added).
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reasonableness will be determined, and that in turn gives courts
great discretion in resolving this question of fact. While such a
factual-legal test may work well in the courtroom, it wreaks havoc
on conscientious issuers who are required to know what activities
satisfy the standard in advance of a judicial determination.
A particularly harsh aspect of this requirement is that the
reasonable grounds must exist before the issuer makes an offer,
regardless of whether a purchase results. To establish such reason-
able grounds the issuer would be, in most cases, forced to communi-
cate with the potential offeree. This places the issuer in the
tenuous position of endeavoring to ascertain detailed personal
financial information while remaining sufficiently aloof so that
the prospective investor's interest is not aroused to the extent
that the issuer's actions constitute an offer. It is true that the
SEC has greatly limited this' danger by providing that an in-
quiry to verify a belief of reasonable grounds is not an offer. But
the exact meaning of this statement is not clear, and issuers still
must be careful so that their communications are all related to the
verification process.
It is a crucial fact that the issuer has the burden of proving
that reasonable grounds existed. Accordingly, a prudent issuer
should keep records of all persons contacted as prospective offerees
so that evidence would be available later if proof is required that
reasonable grounds were relied upon. Another oppressive phase
of the reasonable grounds requirement is that where it is found
that reasonable grounds did not exist for making an offer, the Rule
146 exemption may be rendered totally invalid, even though the
offeree never became a purchaser.32
The concept in Rule 146 most likely to cause consternation is
the sophistication requirement. Section 146 (d) (1) (k) enunciates
the Commission's test for offeree sophistication as: possession of
"such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the pro-
spective investment." Since the knowledge and experience needed
to satisfy this condition depend on the particular prospective in-
vestment, this complex test requires an examination of the offeree's
background as well as a conclusion that such background has prop-
erly prepared the offeree to tackle skillfully the investment at
32. In its Synopsis of the Provisions of Rule 146, the SEC has provided
that when an offeree or even a purchaser is unqualified, the whole
exemption will not be wiped out so long as reasonable grounds ex-
isted. But what if the judgment of the issuer on that score was
wrong? SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,264 (1974).
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hand.33 The potential inconvenience and cost to the issuer caused
by the necessity of investigating and evaluating is tremendous, be-
cause the sophistication of each offeree must be established or the
exemption could be destroyed with respect to every purchaser. The
sophistication criterion presents a question of fact, thus making it
so maze-like that some issuers might be deterred from attempting
to comply with Rule 146.
Perhaps the words of Rule 146 (d) (1) (i), setting out the require-
ment of sophistication, are meant to induce issuers to look to case
law in deducing what comprises financial sophistication. If so,
Rule 146 has done nothing to lift issuers out of the quandary left by
the case law, which offers diverse and uncertain views of the con-
cept 34 of sophistication.3
5
If the offeree is not sophisticated, he must be rich, or at least
"able to bear the economic risk of the investment." Rather than
define such a nebulous phrase, the SEC has chosen merely to pro-
vide the hapless issuer with two important considerations: 36
33. The inclusion of several variables in the sophistication formula aug-
ments the potential for misjudgments by issuers. For example, even
if the investment proposal is a relatively simple one, can the offeree
ever be deemed sophisticated under the test if he never has dealt in
the particular type of investment offered? Is experience in the stock
market the same as experience in option trading? Or, if the invest-
ment is a complex one, must the offeree have experience with equally
complicated transactions?
Another twist might involve an offeree with both education and
experience in the specific type of investment to be analyzed, but with
a record of constantly losing money on such investments. Must the
issuer go so far as to try to analyze the previous transactions of the
prospective offeree to see if the past failures were simply bad luck?
It is also worth noting that in the negotiation stages, when the of-
feree is enthusiastic, he may try to impress the issuer with his sophis-
tication in financial concerns. Yet, after the investment has proved
disappointing, the purchaser may change his tone, if not his tune. This
possibility underscores the need for issuers to procure outside evidence
pertaining to the purchaser's background.
34. It is a salient consideration that sophistication has taken on the status
of a legal concept.
[Tihe more deeply we get involved in an analysis of con-
cepts in operation, a number of questions arise that cast
doubts on how far they can actually advance us towards mak-ing law objective and knowable, towards relieving judges of
the burden of detailed inquiry and choice.
W. BisHnn & C. SToNE, LAw, LANGUAGE, AND ETmIcs 170 (1972).
35. For example, must each offeree possess "exceptional" or "unusual
business experience and skill," as required by Lively v. Hirschfield,
440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971)? For an outstanding article which
portrays the intangibility of the sophistication concept as developed by
case law, see Proposed SEC Rule 146: The Quest for Objectivity, supra
note 17, at 887 & nn.89-95 (1973).
36. S.E.C. Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261-62 (1974).
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1. Whether the offeree could afford to hold unregistered securities
for an indefinite period, and;
2. Whether, at the time of the investment, he could afford37 a
complete loss.
An examination of these two factors reveals that the "able to fend"
test is tantamount to the suitability standard relating to stock-
brokers. 38 A legitimate criticism of such a suitability standard can
be constructed on the grounds that traditionally the 1933 Act has
been concerned only with fair disclosure, not with the merits of
particular securities.39 Since the purchaser's financial information
would not need to be supplied under the 1933 Act for registered
securities, the argument is made that it should not be required for
unregistered securities.40
Even assuming that it is appropriate to include a suitability test
in a private placement exemption, the particular test incorporated
in Rule 146 is open to serious attack. Specifically, what do the
words "bear" and "economic risk" denote? Does "bear" mean that
if all were lost the investor would not need to change his lifestyle in
the slightest? Or does it mean only that bankruptcy would not
be necessary? Given the second consideration, namely, that the in-
vestor be able to afford a complete loss, "economic risk" apparently
means the possible loss of the total investment. Yet, it is possible
that the term "economic risk" may require using a scale of proba-
bilities to determine the likelihood of losing various percentages of
the investment.
Ascertaining the offeree's ability to bear the risk would seem
to necessitate, at a minimum, inspection of the offeree's net
worth. For a multitude of reasons, however, offerees may be reti-
cent in revealing an exact net worth, not to mention its composi-
tion. Thus, this requirement could cause some investors to forego
buying privately offered securities.
Assuming arguendo that all offerees would voluntarily divulge
any financial information the issuer requested, how is the issuer
to evaluate that information?41 Would an uninflated net worth
37. It is ironic that in endeavoring to explain the "able to bear" language
the Commission introduced further ambiguity through use of the
words "could afford" in both of the considerations. (Emphasis added).
38. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15610-3 (1972).
39. Not only does the suitability requirement arguably exceed the rule-
making authority of the SEC, but such a requirement may also dis-
criminate against the poor. Read strictly, the requirement might make
private offering securities available only to the rich. SEC Rule 146-
The Private Placement Exemption, supra note 5, at 1150-51.
40. Id.
41. It should be recognized at the outset of a search for a proper criterion
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of $250,000 be sufficient in all cases? Use of such a flat figure
would of course provide certitude, but unfortunately would have
no correlation to the size of the economic risk. Accordingly, the
best proposal would be to require an offeree to have a net worth
at least equal to a specified multiple of the proposed investment.
Before actually selling a security in a private offering, the issuer
must, according to 146 (d) (2), have reasonable grounds to believe,
after making a "reasonable inquiry," that the purchaser is "rich"
and sophisticated (or at least has a sophisticated representative).
The SEC has in effect stated that reasonable grounds cannot exist
before an investigation has occurred. While the "reasonable in-
quiry" test can be viewed as a clarification of the "reasonable
grounds" standard, it can also be seen as another snag in the path
of the issuer. Issuers must not only resolve at what point their
sleuthing has matured into a "reasonable inquiry," but they must
also conclude on the basis of the information procured whether
"reasonable grounds" exist. Because the issuer bears the burden
of proving reasonable inquiry, tangible evidence should be carefully
maintained.
If the offeree is not financially sophisticated, the issuer may not
sell to him unless there is an offeree representative with the
requisite sophistication. Although the Commission in promulgating
the test for offeree representative sophistication used the same
words as for offeree sophistication, it is possible to infer that the test
will not be treated the same in both situations. Specifically, courts
might expect a higher level of financial expertise from an avowed
expert (i.e., the representative of the offeree). In light of the "edu-
cation and experience" portion of the test, it is not necessarily safe
to assume that lawyers are per se qualified financial analysts, be-
cause many lawyers do not have a background in, and do not in
their practice normally deal with, financial problems. One solution
to the problem of determining offeree representative sophistication
might be to adopt a class of persons, such as registered stockbrokers,
who are deemed per se qualified.42
for financial security that the tests chosen will not in and of them-
selves ensure that the offeree is sophisticated. Even if an offeree is
a millionaire the money may have all been inherited. Or, the million
dollars net worth may be totally invested in non-liquid assets. Nev-
ertheless, this does not diminish the effectiveness of the Rule, for pur-
chasers must be "rich" and "sophisticated," at least in conjunction with
their representative.
42. Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 5, at 637. This article also points out
that
[I]t is unclear whether the issuer may recommend an offeree
representative to the offeree, whether the offeree representa-
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It is noteworthy that as a whole, section 146 (d) operates to pre-
vent small, inexperienced investors from participating in private
offerings,43 yet one of the original reasons behind private offerings
was to allow small businesses to raise relatively small amounts of
capital from friends, business acquaintances, etc. The thrust of
Rule 146 (d) is to make it easier for institutional investors to be
active in the private placement market, but much more difficult
for the small investor to be so.44
E. Access to or Furnishing of Information-146(e)
It is instructive to pay heed to the opening note under section
(e), which advances the Commission's view of the access concept:
Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with re-
spect to the issuer. Position means an employment or family
relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree
to obtain information from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits
and risks of the prospective investment.
This note reveals that the SEC has perpetuated the confusing judi-
cial notion of considering access in terms of special relationships
between the issuer and offeree (e.g., family and employment). In
addition, the Commission has added to this list those relationships
based on economic bargaining power.45  This latter criterion
makes it relatively easy for powerful institutions to meet the access
requirement. Simultaneously, the Commission has shut the door
tive's fee may be paid by the issuer from the proceeds of the
offering or whether each offeree must pay the fee directly to
the offeree representative.
Id.
43. SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemptions, supra note 5, at
1152.
44. Could this lead to a perpetuation of the "rich get richer" phenomenon?
Could it stifle individual initiative in the investment field? Such
questions perhaps overstate the significance to small investors of the
private offering, since in many situations the offering can be made to
conform to the parameters of either a Regulation A offering or the
intrastate offering exemption. Nevertheless, these offerings will not
always be satisfactory. The time and money spent in filing a Regula-
tion A offering can be almost as great as that spent with fully regis-
tered offerings. See Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings and Regu-
lation A-Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAw 303 (1958). The in-
trastate offering exemption is cast in such rigid terms that in many
situations it simply will not be a viable alternative. It will, for exam-
ple, normally present problems for issuers located in populous areas
very close to the state's geographical borders.
45. The addition by the SEC of "bargaining power" to the test of "insider
status" employed by Continental Tobacco appears to represent a di-
vergence from the case law.
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on smaller, less economically influential investors who will prob-
ably not be held to have sufficient bargaining power vis-h-vis the
issuer to compel disclosure of all registration-type information.
Admittedly, this discussion is speculative, because it is unclear how
much bargaining power is necessary to gain access to the material
information investors require in order to make informed de-
cisions. 46 Finally, it should be noted that the terms "employment or
family relationship" are not entirely unambiguous.
The SEC has propounded a relatively objective test for the type
of information to which the offeree 47 must have access. The issuer
knows that if it supplies all the information called for in Schedule
A48 it will be safe. The Commission, however, in an apparent at-
tempt to add leniency to this requirement, tacked on the qualifying
phrase "to the extent that the issuer possesses such information
or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense." Asking
issuers to second guess what courts will deem to be unreasonable
effort or expense is a tough order.49 Another question left unre-
solved by the Rule's access notion is whether the issuer must act
affirmatively by supplying the offerees with material information
or whether it could await an offeree's request for information. It
would appear, however, that the issuer must at least be willing to
open its books to offerees. But this could prove burdensome for the
issuer since it might result in a general disruption of the business.50
Perhaps because the SEC recognized the inherently imprecise
nature of the traditional access notion, it has provided in subpara-
graph (e) (1) (ii) that issuers may meet the access requirement by
furnishing the same kind of information that is specified in
Schedule A (to the extent it can be required without unreasonable
46. Greater objectivity could be given the special relationship test by spe-
cifying certain relationships which per se possess the requisite bargain-
ing power to gain access. For example, institutions with certain char-
acteristics or voting members of the board of directors might be
granted such status.
47. Section (e) (1) (i) is phrased so as to include only offerees. Thus,
even if the offeree's representative has the special relationship neces-
sary for access it will be to no avail.
48. Schedule A is that portion of the 1933 Act which, along with sections
7 and 10, prescribes the contents of the registration statement and pro-
spectus.
49. It has been pointed out that not only is "unreasonable expense" unde-
fined, but it is also unclear what alternatives may be available if
Schedule A-type information is in fact unreasonably expensive to pro-
duce. SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemptions, supra
note 5, at 1158.
50. Finebaum, Proposed Rule 146-A Temporary Solution, 23 BUFFALO L.
REv. 67, 80 (1973).
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expense). This alternative to the traditional access approach has
provided greater certainty for issuers, at least those which are
reporting companies, because the provisions detailing the type of
information required of issuers subject to the reporting require-
ments of section 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
though somewhat complicated, are concrete.51
The established, relatively more powerful companies-the re-
porting companies-have benefited from this increased certainty
since they are already required to compile the kind of information
necessary to satisfy the disclosure provision [ (e) (1) (ii) ] of Rule 146.
The price for this greater certainty, however, will probably be paid
by the smaller, less well-established, non-reporting companies. In
order to meet the disclosure requirements, these companies must
furnish "the information that would be required to be included in
a registration statement filed, under the Act on the form which
the issuer would be entitled to use. ' 52 One commentator has ob-
served there may be some risk in determining exactly what infor-
mation the foregoing test requires, since issuers will not have the
guidance normally supplied in a full registration by SEC staff
comments.53
Even assuming that the exact information is ascertainable, the
really insidious aspect of this provision is that:
[t]he difficulty of complying with these requirements may vary,
depending upon the status of an issuer. For a publicly held com-
pany which is subject to the reporting requirements of the Ex-
change Act, the information which must be furnished can be
assembled and supplied probably without expending a great
amount of time or expense. However, for the start-up situation or
the small, existing privately held issuer, complying with the Rule
is, in all likelihood, too expensive and burdensome, since the
information would not be readily available.54
If the disclosure requirements of private offerings under Rule
146 have become as burdensome to small issuers as regular offer-
ings or even Regulation A offerings, then one of the bedrock prin-
ciples underlying private offerings, namely, that they provide an
inexpensive method of issuing securities, has been erased. It is sub-
mitted that the situation could be improved if the SEC would draft
a special, less detailed disclosure form for non-reporting companies.
Rather than drafting such a disclosure form, however, the SEC
51. Rule 146 (e) (1) (ii) (a) (1)-(2), Appendix.
52. Rule 146 (e) (1) (ii) (b), Appendix.
53. Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 5, at 640.
54. Rosenfeld, Rule 146 Leaves Private Offering Waters Still Muddied, 2
SEc. REG. L.J. 195, 205 (1974).
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in a recent release 55 merely qualified subparagraph (e) (1) (ii) (b),
as follows:
A. The issuer may omit details or employ condensation of
information if, under the circumstances, the omitted information is
not material or the condensation of information does not render the
statements made misleading.
NOTE: The issuer would have the burden of proof to show that,
under the circumstances, the omitted information is not material
and that any condensation does not render the statements made
misleading.56
The amendment further states that if the issuer can furnish neither
audited nor unaudited financial statements "without unreasonable
effort or expense, the financial statements required by Regulation
A under the Act may be furnished."5 7 These amendments to Rule
146 are an admirable attempt to lessen the burden on issuers, es-
pecially small issuers. Arguably, however, they do not go far
enough. The SEC should have simply drafted a minimal disclosure
form, thus eliminating the need for the ambiguous language "with-
out reasonable effort or expense." Furthermore, since the burden
is on issuers to show that any omissions from Schedule A were not
material, they may be reluctant to take advantage of the less strin-
gent requirements.
Another weighty provision of 146 (e) is found in section (e) (2):
The issuer shall make available, during the course of the
transaction and prior to sale, to each offeree or his offeree repre-
sentative(s) or both, the opportunity to ask questions of, and
receive answers from, the issuer or any person acting on its behalf
concerning the terms and conditions of the offering and to obtain
any additional information, to the extent the issuer possesses such
information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or
expense, necessary to verify the accuracy of the information ob-
tained pursuant to subparagraph (e) (1) above; ....
It is readily apparent that the words "any additional information,
to the extent the issuer possesses such information or can acquire
it without unreasonable effort or expense, necessary to verify the
. . . information obtained pursuant to subparagraph (e) (1) "58 con-
tain a multiplicity of uncertainties. The paramount question is how
far must issuers go to appease zealous investors. Must the issuer
afford offerees the opportunity of perusing all company correspond-
55. SEC Release No. 5585, 40 Fed. Reg. 21,709 (1975).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Emphasis was supplied to those terms which are crucial to interpret-
ing the phrase to illustrate the tremendous potential for interpretive
nightmares lurking in the provision.
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ence? Or must receipts and daily records be produced so that
offerees can double-check the issuer's bookkeeping? While these
two examples would probably be held "unreasonably expensive,"
it is clear that much hinges on how strictly the provision is con-
strued.5 9 This emphasizes the great latitude available to the
judge, and the attendant unpredictability confronting issuers.
F. Business Combinations-146(f)
A major hurdle is created by section (f) (3), which states that
an offeree who needs an offeree representative in order to satisfy
the knowledge and experience test, and who refuses to have one,
may make the Rule unavailable for the transaction.00
Another dilemma is posed where the management of an acquired
company is not deemed to be financially sophisticated.0 1 In such
a case, the management may not act as an offeree representative.6 2
Only in unusual circumstances would the issuer in a 146 (f)
transaction be justified in relying on the access notion of 146
(e) (1) (ii) to satisfy the Rule's information requirements. 3 The
average shareholder simply does not possess the bargaining power
needed to have access. But this is really a problem of double access,
for even if the individual shareholder has access to information of
the acquired company there is a further question of whether the
company to be acquired has sufficient bargaining power to consti-
tute access with respect to the issuer, i.e., the acquiring corpora-
tion. 4
G. Number of Purchasers-146(g)
Rule 146(g) (1), as originally drafted, provided that "[t] here
shall be no more than thirty-five purchasers of the securities of
the issuer from the issuer in any offering pursuant to the rule."
Casting the "numbers" test in terms of a concrete number of pur-
chasers represents a rather bold severing of the prior law in the
private offering area.6 5  Through this changing of the test, the
59. "Virtually all information is 'available' if unlimited time and effort
is devoted to compiling it, and thus a court is left with considerable
discretion, and an issuer with considerable doubt, as to where to draw
the line." Note, Revising the Private Placement Exemption, 82 Y=
L.J. 1512, 1520 (1973).
60. SEC Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,264 (1974).
61. SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemption, supra note 5, at
1159.
62. Rule 146(f) (3), Appendix.
63. Rosenfeld, supra note 54, at 211.
64. Id.
65. The landmark Ralston-Purina case stated that "there is no warrant
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Commission has transformed a previously murky test into a
supremely objective one. The SEC deserves the accolades it has
received for this feat.66 Choosing a particular number, such as
thirty-five, necessarily entails a somewhat arbitrary process. But
the cogent rationale behind setting a relatively low number (such
as thirty-five) is that when there are so few purchasers the expense
and time consumed in going through the motions of the registration
process outweigh the limited benefits which would accrue.
In an effort to ease the burden on issuers who in good faith
believed there were no more than thirty-five purchasers, the SEC
recently changed the "there shall be no more than thirty-five pur-
chasers" language to "The issuer shall have reasonable grounds to
believe, and after making reasonable inquiry, shall believe, that
there are no more than thirty-five purchasers. '67 This is precisely
the kind of change which is needed, for it will help lighten the
burden imposed by 146(b) which states that all of the conditions
must be met or the Rule will be lost.
A note following subparagraph (g) (1) directs readers to Pre-
liminary Note 3 and section (b) (1) which together state that the
"thirty-five purchasers" test is to be construed in conjunction with
the integration approach to defining an "offering." Specifically,
section (b) (1) sets up a "safe harbour" for sales made within six
months (before or after) any sale within the Rule.68 This "safe
harbour" provision, in conjunction with the given factors of the
integration concept, offers sufficient certainty to issuers.
Subparagraph (2) of Rule 146 (g) defines certain classes of pur-
chasers which are to be excluded in counting to thirty-five. The
most prominent provision is 146 (g) (2) (i) (d) which includes "any
person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash in
a single payment or installments, securities of the issuer in the
aggregate amount of $150,000 or more." Thus, the Rule sets no
numerical limit on the number of institutional investors which can
meet this large cash requirement. 69 As has been discussed, these
for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter
of statutory interpretation." SEC v. Ralston-Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,
125 (1953). Of course Rule 146 still indirectly controls the number
of offerees through other sections such as the sophistication and access
standards.
66. Cf. SEC Rule 146-The Private Placement Exemption, supra note 5, at
167.
67. SEC Release No. 5585, 40 Fed. Reg. 21, 709 (1975).
68. Under section (b) (1) if two offerings are at least six months apart
they will be considered separate under Rule 146.
69. In practice institutional investors often invest more than $150,000 per
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institutional investors will not normally experience difficulty in
satisfying the sophistication and access criteria. Even the "negoti-
ated transaction" requirement found in the Proposed Rule 146,
which proved troublesome for institutional investors, was deleted
from Rule 146 as issued in April, 1974JO Thus, through this special
treatment for $150,000 or more cash purchasers, the Rule has again
evidenced favoritism toward large versus small investors.
Section (g) (2) (ii) of the Rule clarifies the term "purchaser" by
stating:
There shall be counted as one purchaser any corporation,
partnership, association, joint stock company, trust or unincor-
porated organization, except that if such entity was organized for
the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, each bene-
ficial owner of equity interests or equity securities in such entity
shall count as a separate purchaser.
A note following this section refers to the Rule's Preliminary Note
571 which teaches 72 that clients of an investment advisor, customers
of a broker or dealer, or persons of similar relationships shall be
considered the "offerees" or "purchasers" regardless of the degree
of discretion given to the advisor or broker by the client. If the
law were otherwise, a serious loophole would exist; therefore, this
provision seems justified.
H. Limitations on Disposition-146(h)
This section sets forth the various steps which issuers must take
before selling Rule 146 securities to ensure that the purchasers are
not underwriters. Stop transfer instructions and legends are al-
ready in common use. Additionally, section (h) requires that the
investment, so this requirement seems designed to embrace sales to
institutional investors. Note, 59 Va L. REV. 886, 904 (1973).
70. Compare the Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26,139 (1972) with 38
Fed. Reg. 15, 263 (1973).
71. Preliminary Note 5 states:
Clients of an investment adviser, customers of a broker or
dealer, trusts administered by a bank trust department or per-
sons with similar relationships shall be considered to be the
"offerees" or "purchasers" for purposes of the rule regardless
of the amount of discretion given to the investment adviser,
broker or dealer, bank trust department or other person to act
on behalf of the client, customer or trust.
72. "Teaches" is probably the most appropriate word in that many law-
yers, relying on an earlier SEC no-action letter, had for years been
telling clients that where several purchases are made by one invest-
ment advisor on behalf of several clients who had given the advisor
full discretion in investing, only one purchase had occurred. These
lawyers learned that the law had changed with the promulgation of
Rule 146. SEC Rule 146-the Private Placement Exemptions, supra
note 5, at 1164.
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issuer obtain "a written agreement from the purchaser that the
securities will not be resold without registration or exemption
therefrom,"73 and that issuers make "reasonable inquiry" to deter-
mine if the purchaser is purchasing for his own account.7 4  By
using the words "reasonable inquiry," without supplying guidelines
as to their meaning, the Commission has introduced an uncertain
test.
It is interesting to note that section (h) states that the reason-
able care required of issuers "shall include, but not necessarily, be
limited to," the previously enumerated four acts the issuer must
perform. This cryptic phrase, apparently intended to create a "good
faith" requirement for issuers, is inherently subjective.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The rationale underlying the private offering exemption is that
the money, time, and energy necessary to comply with section 5
of the 1933 Act by filing a registration statement and prospectus
is too great when balanced against the attenuated need for such
disclosure in small or non-public offerings. Implicit in this core
notion is the belief that the raising of venture capital, which in turn
fuels economic growth, is an important concern for businessmen
which cannot always be subservient to investor protection.
Based on the major ambiguities contained in and created by Rule
146, it could be concluded that the Commission had, in the balanc-
ing process, deferred to considerations related to investor protection
to such an extent that the certainty provided by the Rule was
emasculated to the point where many businessmen, especially the
less successful ones, would find the Rule unworkable. Assuming
that balancing is necessary, one might reasonably determine, that
the Federal Securities Code75 has also crossed over the neutral
zone by not providing enough investor protection.
It is possible to reach a compromise between these two ap-
proaches and still retain sufficient objectivity to permit all levels
73. Rule 146 (h) (4), Appendix.
74. Id.
75. ALI FEum AL SEcURITIEs CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The Code,
drafted by Professor Loss, defines a limited offering as "one in which
the initial buyers are institutional investors and not more than thirty-
five other persons . . ." Id. at 12. Also, general advertising is not
permitted. The most noticeable aspect of the Code is that it totally
abandoned the sophistication requirement with respect to the 35 pur-
chasers. It is submitted that at least a small degree of investor pro-
tection is a necessary element of a fair private offering exemption.
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of business to utilize the exemption advantageously. This portion
of the article will sketch the direction such an approach should take.
Today there is concensus that certain institutional investors are
appropriate purchasers in an exempt offering because they possess
financial sophistication and security as well as bargaining power.
Accordingly, certain institutions should be excluded in counting the
number of offerees and purchasers allowed. The ALI Code's objec-
tive definition of institutions can offer the certainty needed as to
what is an institution.76 The Code's definition permits the classes
falling within the definition to be expanded or contracted objec-
tively. One such objective standard could be a requirement that the
institution have net assets, as shown by their tax returns, at least
equal to a certain multiple of the prospective investment. Under
such a definition at least some institutions, those presumptively not
needing the protection of the registration process, would be per se
able to participate in the private placement market.
In addition to institutions, many wealthy individuals have little
need for the prospectus required by section 5 of the 1933 Act.
Accordingly, to allow such presumably sophisticated individuals to
participate, they too would be excluded in counting the number
of offerees and purchasers allowed. An objective test for such
wealthy individuals would be the one embodied in Rule 146 (g) (2)
(i) (d), which excludes from the numerical limit on purchasers those
who buy, for cash, securities of the issuer amounting to $150,000
or more. Generally, persons who deal in such large amounts of
securities are financially sophisticated and can afford to take the
risks presented by the investment (as evidenced by payment in
cash). It must be recognized, however, that occasionally invest-
ments of such magnitude may be made by persons lacking financial
sophistication.77 To ensure that such an investor is not financially
76. The Code defines "institutional investor" as follows:
(a) a bank, insurance company, or registered investment com-
pany, or a parent of any such person, except to the extent that
the Commission provides otherwise by rule with respect to
any such class of persons on the basis of such factors as finan-
cial sophistication, net worth, and the amount of assets under
investment management, or (b) any other person of a class
that the Commission designates by rule on the basis of such
factors.
Id. § 242, at 19. The Reporter's Comment to that section advises that
"[it is simply impossible to make all the necessary discriminations
by statute." Id. Thus, it would be incumbent on the SEC to expand
or contract the classes of institutional investors included in the defini-
tion.
77. For example, a person may have inherited great wealth and yet have
no experience in financial matters.
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ruined, a requirement that there be a minimum net worth, such
as $750,000, should be established. Alternatively, all individuals
making purchases over $150,000 could be required to consult with
an investment advisor. To keep this requirement objective, a class
of investment advisors who are per se qualified should be estab-
ished.78
Furthermore, "any relative or spouse of a purchaser and any
relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such pur-
chaser" 79 should be excluded from the counting process. This al-
lows a husband and wife who purchase separately for tax or other
reasons to be counted as one purchaser. Finally, voting members
of the issuer's board of directors should not be counted as pur-
chasers, since it is fair to infer that directors have access to the
kind of information that would be included in a prospectus. 80 The
proposed provision should include only full-fledged, voting direc-
tors in order to keep issuers from adding directors to evade the
registration requirements.
The exclusionary provisions just outlined mostly cater to the
large investor. The more difficult, yet critical challenge is to pro-
vide for at least limited participation by smaller investors. In this
way one of the original reasons for the private offering exemption-
to allow small businessmen to raise capital from friends, family,
business associates, etc., without undue expense-can be realized.
The sophistication/access requirements of Rule 146 present virtual
roadblocks to small issuers. Accordingly, these idealistic con-
cepts should be jettisoned in favor of a "number of offerees and
purchasers" test. In keeping with the notion that a non-public
offering should be a relatively small one, a proper approach might
be to allow only twenty purchasers. Further, a limit-perhaps
fifty-should be placed on the number of offerees. The purpose
of an offeree's test in this approach would be to encourage the
issuer to choose offerees carefully. Thus, the issuer would feel con-
strained to extend initial offers to those most likely to be in a posi-
tion to accept (i.e., those with available investment funds). In turn,
the fact that relatively wealthy people will be approached by the
issuer acts as a crude sophistication requirement since it is pre-
sumed that those with funds to invest are generally in a better
78. As an example, the class of qualified investment advisors could in-
dude brokers who had been for the previous five years a member of
NASD.
79. Rule 146(g) (2) (i) (a), Appendix.
80. If directors are not well versed in the company's business, they are
probably violating their duty as directors. See Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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position than most to withstand the risk of loss and are more
familiar with money matters.
Irrespective of the partial screening process supplied by these
numbers tests, there will still be a group of potential buyers who
possess few of the attributes making up sophistication. As a mini-
mum measure of protection, therefore, before any purchase, the
issuer should provide all offerees with a letter putting them on no-
tice of the risks of private offerings. Although the exact wording
of a satisfactory letter could be developed by the SEC, such a letter
should explain that private offering securities are different from
most securities because they are not registered and, therefore, it
may be more difficult for an investor to ascertain the risks involved
since no prospectus will be available. To offset partially that disad-
vantage the letter should urge investors to take advantage of their
opportunity, upon request, to: (1) receive by mail a short circular
containing the issuer's latest prepared financial statements includ-
ing at the least a balance sheet and income statement for the three
most recent years (if the business has existed that long);81 (2)
have the issuer send a short statement describing the type of
business it is engaged in and the proposed use of the proceeds from
the private offering; and (3) visit the business site and ask ques-
tions of management.82
Even if there are instances where the financial statements would
not be meaningful to particular purchasers, those documents could
serve as a basis for suit under the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933
Act. In this connection, special notice should be taken of how
buyers are protected from fraudulent conduct by the recent, ever-
expanding parameters of Rule 10 (b) (5) of Section 10 (b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.83
For purposes of determining what offers are part of an offering,
the "safe harbour" provisions and integration factors set out in Rule
146 would seem to provide a clear guideline for issuers. Further,
general advertising should continue to be prohibited.
Finally, the limitations on disposition should include: (1) placing
legends on certificates, (2) issuing stop transfer instructions, and
(3) obtaining from the purchaser a signed written agreement that
the securities will not be sold without registration under the Act
unless he is exempt from this requirement.
81. The financial statements sent should be audited unless the issuer has
no audited statements.
82. If the issuer has decided not to sell to a particular offeree, no duty
of disclosure should continue to exist with respect to that offeree.
83. 'For a background in Rule 10b-5, see R. JENmnGs & H. MARsh, supra
note 3.
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Appendix
Rule 146
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975). Transactions by an issuer deemed not to involve
any public offering.
PRELIMINARY NOTES
1. The Commission recognizes that no one rule can adequately cover
all legitimate private offers and sales of securities. Transactions by an is-
suer which do not satisfy all of the conditions of this rule shall not raise
any presumption that the exemption provided by section 4(2) of the Act
is not available for such transactions. Issuers wanting to rely on that ex-
emption may do so by complying with administrative and judicial inter-
pretations in effect at the time of the transactions. Attempted compliance
with this rule does not act as an election; the issuer can also claim the avail-
ability of section 4(2) outside the rule.
2. Nothing in this rule obviates the need for compliance with any ap-
plicable state law relating to the offer and sale of securities.
3. Section 5 of the Act requires that all securities offered by the use
of mails or other channels of interstate commerce be registered with the
Commission. Congress, however, provided certain exemptions in the Act
from such registration provisions where there was no practical need for reg-
istration or where the public benefits of registration were too remote.
Among these exemptions is that provided by section 4(2) of the Act for
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering. The courts and
the Commission have interpreted the section 4(2) exemption to be available
for offerings to persons who have access to the same kind of information
that registration would provide and who are able to fend for themselves.
The indefiniteness of such terms as "public offering," "access" and "fend
for themselves" has led to uncertainties with respect to the availability of
the section 4 (2) exemption. Rule 146 is designed to provide, to the extent
feasible, objective standards upon which responsible businessmen may rely
in raising capital under claim of the section 4(2) exemption and also to
deter reliance on that exemption for offerings of securities to persons who
need the protections afforded by the registration process.
In order to obtain the protection of the rule, all its conditions must be
satisfied and the issuer claiming the availability of the rule has the burden
of establishing, in an appropriate form, that it has satisfied them. The bur-
den of proof applies with respect to each offeree as well as each purchaser.
See "Lively v. Hirschfeld," 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971). Broadly speaking,
the conditions of the rule relate to limitations on the manner of the offering,
the nature of the offerees, access to or furnishing of information, the number
of purchasers, and limitations on disposition.
The term "offering" is not defined in the rule. The determination as
to whether offers, offers to sell, offers for sale, or sales of securities are
part of an offering (i.e., are deemed to be "integrated") depends on the
particular facts and circumstances. See Securities Act Release No. 4552
(November 6, 1962) (27 FR 11316). All offers, offers to seli, offers for sale,
or sales which are part of an offering must meet all of the conditions of
Rule 146 for the rule to be available. Release 33-4552 indicates that in de-
termining whether offers and sales, should be regarded as a part of a larger
offering and thus should be integrated, the following factors should be con-
sidered:(a) Whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
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(c) Whether the offerings are made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is to be received; and
(e) Whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
4. Rule 146 relates to transactions exempted from section 5 by Section
4 (2) of the Act. It does not provide an exemption from the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the securities laws or the civil liability provisions of section 12 (2)
of the Act or other provisions of the securities laws, including the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.
5. Clients of an investment adviser, customers of a broker or dealer,
trusts administered by a bank trust department or persons with similar re-
lationships shall be considered to be the "offerees" or "purchasers" for pur-
poses of the rule regardless of the amount of discretion given to the invest-
ment adviser, broker or dealer, bank trust department or other person to
act on behalf of the client, customer or trust.
6. The rule is available only to the issuer of the securities and is not
available to affiliates or other persons for sales of the issuer's securities.
7. Finally, in view of the objectives of the rule and the purposes and
policies underlying the Act, the rule is not available to any issuer with re-
spect to any transactions which, although in technical compliance with the
rule, are part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of
the Act. In such cases registration pursuant to the Act is required.
(a) Definitions. The following definitions shall apply for purposes of
this rule.
(1) Offeree representative. The term "offeree representative" shall
mean any person or persons, each of whom the issuer and any person act-
ing on its behalf, after making reasonable inquiry, have reasonable grounds
to believe and believe satisfies all of the following conditions:
(i) Is not an affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer,
or beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of the equity securi-
ties or 10 percent or more of the equity interest in the issuer, except where
the offeree is:
(a) Related to such person by blood, marriage or adoption, no more re-
motely than as first cousin;
(b) Any trust or estate in which such person or any persons related to
him as specified in paragraph (a) (1) (i) (a) or (c) of this section col-
lectively have 100 percent of the beneficial interest (excluding contingent
interests) or of which any such person serves as trustee, executor, or in
any similar capacity; or
(c) Any corporation or other organization in which such person or any
persons related to him as specified in paragraph (a) (1) (i) (a) or (b) of
this section collectively are the beneficial owners of 100 percent of the
equity securities (excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interest;
(ii) Has such knowledge and experience in financial and business mat-
ters that he, either alone, or together with other offeree representatives or
the offeree, is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment;
(ii) is acknowledged by the offeree, in writing, during the course of
the transaction, to be his offeree representative in connection with evalu-
ating the merits and risks of the prospective investment; and
(iv) discloses to the offeree, in writing, prior to the acknowledgement
specified in paragraph (a) (1) (iii) of this. section, any material relationship
between such person or its affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates, which
then exists or is mutually understood to be contemplated or which has ex-
isted at any time during the previous two years, and any compensation re-
ceived or to be received as a result of such relationship.
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NoTE 1: Persons acting as offeree representatives should consider the
applicability of the registration and anti-fraud provisions relating to brokers
and dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and relating to in-
vestment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
NOTE 2: The acknowledgement required by paragraph (a) (1) (iii) of
this section and the disclosure required by paragraph (a) (1) (iv) of this
section must be made with specific reference to each prospective invest-
ment. Advance blanket acknowledgement, such as for "all securities trans-
actions" or "all private placements", is not sufficient.
NOTE 3: Disclosure of any material relationships between the offeree
representative or its affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates does not relieve
the offeree representative of an obligation to act in the interest of the of-
feree.
(2) Issuer. The definition of the term "issuer" in section 2(4) of the
Act shall apply, provided that notwithstanding that definition, in the case
of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee, receiver, or debtor
in possession shall be deemed to be the issuer in an offering for purposes
of a plan of reorganization or arrangement, if the securities offered are to
be issued pursuant to the plan, whether or not other like securities are of-
fered under the plan in exchange for securities of, or claims against, the
debtor.
(3) Affiliate. The term "affiliate" of a person means a person that di-
rectly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with such person.
(4) Material. The term "material" when used to modify "relationship"
means any relationship that a reasonable investor might consider important
in the making of the decision whether to acknowledge a person as his of-
feree representative.
(b) Conditions to be met. Transactions by an issuer involving the offer,
offer to sell, offer for sale or sale of securities of the issuer that are part
of an offering that is made in accordance with all the conditions of this
rule shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering
within the meaning of section 4(2) of the Act.
(1) For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to
include offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer
pursuant to the exemptions provided by section 3 or section 4(2) of the
Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the Act, that take
place prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six
month period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pur-
suant to this rule, Provided, That there are during neither of said six month
periods any offers, offers nor sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer
of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursu-
ant to the rule.
NoTE: In the event that securities of the same or similar class as those
offered pursuant to the rule are offered, offered for sale or sold less than
six months prior to or subsequent to any offer, offer for sale or sale pur-
suant to the rule, see Preliminary Note 3 hereof as to which offers, offers
to sell, offers for sale or sales may be deemed to be part of the offering.
(c) Limitations on manner of offering. Neither the issuer nor any per-
son acting on its behalf shall offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sell the
securities by means of any form of general solicitation or general advertis-
ing, including but not limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published
in any newspaper, magazine or similar medium or broadcast over television
or radio;
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(2) Any seminar or meeting, except that if paragraph (d) (1) of this
section is satisfied as to each person invited to or attending such seminar
or meeting, and, as to persons qualifying only under paragraph (d) (1) (ii)
of this section, such persons are accompanied by their offeree representa-
tive (s), then such seminar or meeting shall be deemed not to be a form
of general solicitation or general advertising; and
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except
that if paragraph (d) (1) of this section is satisfied as to each person to
whom the communication is directed and the communication contains an
undertaking to provide the information specified by paragraph (e) (1) of
this section on request, such communication shall be deemed not to be a
form of general solicitation or general advertising.
(d) Nature of offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf
who offer, offer to sell, offer for sale or sell the securities shall have rea-
sonable grounds to believe and shall believe:
(1) Immediately prior to making any offer, either:
Ci) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment, or
(ii) That the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk
of the investment; and
(2) Immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable in-
quiry, either:
(i) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment, or
(ii) That the offeree and his offeree representative (s) together have
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that they
are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment
and that the offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.
(e) Access to Dr furnishing of information.
NoTE: Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with re-
spect to the issuer. Position means an employment or family relationship
or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain information
from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.
(1) Either
(i) Each offeree shall have access during the course of the transaction
and prior to the sale to the same kind of information that is specified in
Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer possesses such informa-
tion or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense; or
(ii) Each offeree or his offeree representative (s), or both, shall have
been furnished during the course of the transaction and prior to sale, by
the issuer or any person acting on its behalf, the same kind of information
that is specified in Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer pos-
sesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or ex-
pense. This condition shall be deemed to be satisfied as to an offeree if
the offeree or his offeree representative is furnished with information, ei-
ther in the form of documents actually filed with the Commission or other-
wise, as follows:
(a) In the case of an issuer that is subject to the reporting requirements
of section 13 or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
(1) The information contained in the annual report required to be filed
under the Exchange Act or a registration statement on Form S-1 under the
Act or on Form 10 under the Exchange Act, whichever filing is the most
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recent required to be filed, and the information contained in any definitive
proxy statement required to be filed pursuant to section 14 of the Exchange
Act and in any reports or documents required to be filed by the issuer pur-
suant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, since the filing of
such annual report or registration statement, and
(2) A brief description of the securities being offered, the use of the pro-
ceeds from the offering, and any material changes in the issuer's affairs
which are not disclosed in the documents furnished;
(b) In the case of all other issuers, the information that would be re-
quired to be included in a registration statement filed under the Act on
the form which the issuer would be entitled to use, Provided, however, That
if the issuer does not have the audited financial statements required by such
form and cannot obtain them without unreasonable effort or expense, such
financial statements may be provided on an unaudited basis;
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (e) (1) (ii) (a) and (b) of this section
exhibits required to be filed with the Commission as part of a registration
statement or report need not be furnished to each offeree or offeree repre-
sentative if the contents of the exhibits are identified and such exhibits are
available pursuant to paragraph (e) (2) of this section; and
(2) The issuer shall make available, during the course of the transaction
and prior to sale, to each offeree or his offeree representative(s) or both,
the opportunity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer
or any person acting on its behalf concerning the terms and conditions of
the offering and to obtain any additional information, to the extent the is-
suer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable ef-
fort or expense, necessary to verify the accuracy of the information obtained
pursuant to paragraph (e) (1) of this section; and
(3) The issuer or any person acting on its behalf shall disclose to each
offeree, in writing, prior to sale:
(i) Any material relationship between his offeree representative(s) or
its affiliates, and the issuer or its affiliates, which then exists or mutually
is understood to be contemplated or which has existed at any time during
the previous two years, and any compensation received or to be received
as a result of such relationship;
(ii) That a purchaser of the securities must bear the economic risk of
the investment for an indefinite period of time because the securities have
not been registered under the Act and, therefore, cannot be sold unless they
are subsequently registered under the Act or an exemption from such reg-
istration is available; and
(iii) The limitations on disposition of the securities set forth in para-
graph (h) (2), (3), and (4) of this section.
NoTE: Information need not be provided and opportunity to obtain ad-
ditional information need not be continued to be provided to any offeree
or offeree representative who, during the course of the transaction, indicates
that he is not interested in purchasing the securities offered, or, except in
the case of any undertaking made pursuant to paragraph (c) (3), to whom
the issuer or any person acting on its behalf has determined not to sell the
securities.
(f) Business combinations. (1) The term "business combination" shall
mean any transaction of the type specified in paragraph (a) of Rule 145
under the Act.
(2) All the conditions of this rule except paragraph (d) and paragraph
(h) (4) of this section shall apply to business combinations.
NoTE: Notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement pursuant to
paragraph (h) (4), any securities acquired in an offering pursuant to para-
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graph (f) are restricted and may not be resold without registration under
the Act or an exemption therefrom.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (f) only, the issuer and any person act-
ing on believe, and shall believe, at the time that any plan for a business
combination is submitted to security holders for their approval, that each
offeree either alone or with his offeree representative (s) has such knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters that he is or they
are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
(4) In addition to information by paragraph (e), the issuer shall pro-
vide, in writing, to each offeree at the time the plan is submitted to security
holders for approval, information about any terms or arrangements of the
proposed transaction relating to any security holder that are not identical
to those relating to all other security holders.
(g) Number of purchasers. (1) There shall be no more than thirty-five
purchasers of the securities of the issuer from the issuer in any offering
pursuant to the rule.
No7s: See paragraph (b) (1) of this section, the note thereto and the
Preliminary Notes as to what may or may not constitute an offering pur-
suant to the rule.
(2) For purposes of computing the number of purchasers for paragraph
(g) (1) of this section only:
(i) The following purchasers shall be excluded:
(a) Any relative or spouse of a purchaser and any relative of such
spouse, who has the same home as such purchaser; and(b) Any trust or estate in which a purchaser or any of the persons re-
lated to him as specified in paragraph (g) (2) (i) (a) or (c) of this section
collectively have 100 percent of the beneficial interest (excluding contingent
interests);
(c) Any corporation or other organization of which a purchaser or any
of the persons related to him as specified in paragraph (g) (2) (i) (a) or
(b) of this section collectively are the beneficial owners of all the equity
securities (excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interest; and(d) Any person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash
in a single payment or installments, securities of the issuer in the aggregate
amount of $150,000 or more.
NoTs: The issuer would have to satisfy all the other provisions of the
rule with respect to the purchasers specified in subdivision (g) (2) (i).
(ii) There shall be counted as one purchaser any corporation, partner-
ship, association, joint stock company, trust or unincorporated organization,
except that if such entity was organized for the specific purpose of acquiring
the securities offered, each beneficial owner of equity interests or equity
securities in such entity shall count as a separate purchaser.
NoTE: See Preliminary Note 5 as to other persons who are considered
to be purchasers.
(h) Limitations on disposition. The issuer and any person acting on its
behalf shall exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the
securities in the offering are not underwriters within the meaning of section
2(11) of the Act. Such reasonable care shall include, but not necessarily
be limited to, the following:
(1) Making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquir-
ing the securities for his own account or on behalf of other persons;(2) Placing a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing
the securities stating that the securities have not been registered under the
Act and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability and
sale of the securities;
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(3) Issuing stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if
any, with respect to the securities, or, if the issuer transfers its own securi-
ties, making a notation in the appropriate records of the issuer; and
(4) Obtaining from the purchaser a signed written agreement that the
securities will not be sold without registration under the Act or exemption
therefrom.
NoTE: Paragraph (h) (4) of this section does not apply to business com-
binations as described in paragraph (f) of this section. Notwithstanding
the absence of a written agreement, the securities are restricted and may
not be resolved without registration under the Act or an exemption there-
from. The issuer for its own protection should consider, however, obtaining
such written agreement even in business combinations.
